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In The Supreme Court
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MARGARET BEARDALL
Appellant and Plaintiff,

Case No.
3453S-
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Respondents and Defendants.
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, JUDGE
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In The Supreme Court
of The State of Utah
MARGARET BEARDALL
Appellant and Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No.
34538

BRIAN MURRAY AND GEORGE
LEWIS MURRAY
Respondents and Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs, Margaret Beardall and Melvin P. Beardall, against Brian Murray
and George Lewis Murray for damages and injuries
arising out of an automobile collision allegedly
caused by the negligence of the defendant Brian
Murray in the operation of his father's vehicle, and
a counterclaim by Brian and George Lewis Murray
for damages caused the Murray automobile.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a special verdict finding the
defendant Brian Murray negligent in the manner in
which he operated his vehicle and plaintiff Margaret Beardall negligent in the manner in which
she operated her vehicle. Based upon the special
verdict returned by the jury, the court directed entry of judgment against the plaintiff, Margaret
Beardall, no cause of action; and for the plaintiff
Melvin Beardall, in the amount of $299.71 for damage to his automobile and costs, and against the
defendants Brian Murray and George Lewis Murray, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant, Margaret Beardall only,
seeks an order remanding the case to the trial court
for a new trial.
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 31st day of December, 1969, the
plaintiff was proceeding east on 800 South Street
near 900 West Street in Mapleton, Utah, also known
as State Road 147. (R-46, R-147) Plaintiff was accompanied by Muriel Diamond. As plaintiff approached the Diamond home, she pulled over into
the Diamond driveway and let l\!Irs. Diamond out
2

She looked in her rear view mirror and saw the
defendant's vehicle some six hundred feet to the
west as she moved back onto the highway from the
Diamond driveway. (R-48) She testified that she
put on her left hand blinker as she proceeded out on
the highway, and kept it on by holding it with her
left hand (R-48). As depicted on plaintiff's exhibit
1, it is 131 feet from Mrs. Diamond's driveway on
the right to plaintiff's driveway on the left. Plaintiff, in preparation for the left turn into her driveway, checked the rear view mirror again and saw
defendant's truck in the right hand lane of traffic
approximately 75 feet behind her (R-48). Plaintiff
then made the left hand turn and was struck by
defendant's vehicle. (R-48)
Defendant testified that he was accompanied in
his father's truck by David Tippetts, and that he
first observed plaintiff's vehicle parked on the right
hand side of the road with the right hand blinker
on (R-87). As plaintiff moved onto the highway and
proceeded east, she was going slower than defendant
who testified that he honked twice and moved over
into the left lane to pass plaintiff who was some two
hundred feet in front of him (R-88). Mrs. Diamond
and plaintiff testified they did not hear th honk
(R-25). As defendant starte to overtake plaintiff,
he testified that he saw the left blinker light blink
3

once and then plaintiff made her turn into her driveway (R-89). When defendant saw the blinker, he
knew she was going to turn, and he turned his wheels
to the left to avoid the accident (R-89). He did not
honk his horn (R-90), but did put on his brakes
prior to impact ( R-89). Plaintiff asked defendant,
"Did you see my blinker light going? I have had it
on since I left Muriel's driveway" (R-50). To which
the defendant answered, "Yes, but too late." (R-50,
R-92).

During the trial, plaintiff called Bryant Hansen as a witness to determine the point of impact.
A foundation was laid as to how this point of impact would be determined, what the witness' qualifications were, and what formulas would be used.
Witness was ready to give his opinion as to the point
of impact, whereupon defendant's counsel objected
and the court sustained the objection and would not
let Mr. Hansen testify as to the point of impact.
The point of impact was critical in the case inasmuch as Mr. Hansen's testimony would have placed
the point of impact on the left edge of the road
rather than in the 1ane of traffic. This would show
that Mrs. Beardall had negotiated a substantial
portion of her turn before the collision. After testimony was introduced in the trial, the jury was
given a special verdict which they returned with im·
4

proper answers. Upon instruction of the court they
were instructed to answer questions five, six, seven,
and eight, wherein they awarded, without regard
to answers one, two, three, and four, concerning

the liability of the parties, the amount of $2,000.00
to Mrs. Beardall for general damages (R-167). Counsel excepted to the jury instructions (R-153), and,
upon denial of a motion for a new trial (R-77),
plaintiff Margaret Beardall appealed.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. The court erred in sustaining defendant's ob-

jection to witness Bryant Hansen's opinion as to
the point of impact.
2. The jury was influenced by bias, prejudice,
and passion in awarding damages to plaintiff, Margaret Beardall.
3. The court erred in its instructions to the jury.

ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO WITNESS
BRYANT HANSEN'S OPINION AS TO THE
POINT OF IMPACT.

Mr. Bryant Hansen, an independent investigator
5

engaged in the business of investigating
for 19 years, testified that he investigated
of the accident herein and made certain
ments embodied in plaintiff's exhibit 1.

accidents
the scene
measurePlaintiff

called Hansen as a rebuttal witness following the
close for defendant's case for the purpose of determining the point of impact. This testimony was
necessary in view of the position of the point of impact previously testified to by the Mapleton City officer. A foundation for the point of impact was laid
by establishing Hansen's technical background,
training, and qualifications in accident reconstruction, and describing the physical factors rel a ting to
the accident, together with the formulas and methods employed by the witness prior to rendering his
opinion on point of impact (R-141 & following).
Defendant's counsel objected to the opinion, and the
court, after first determining that Hansen had not
previously testified as to the point of impact, sustained defendant's objection and Hansen was not
permitted to give his opinion as to the point of im·
pact.
The point of impact in this case is critical inasmuch as the jury found both parties negligent in
the operation of their vehicles. The point of impact
6

that Mr. Hansen would have established would have
placed the collision on the far left side of the highway. Thus, plaintiff would have substantially negotiated her turn prior to collision, leaving the entire right hand lane open for defendant to continue east.
Defendant testified that just prior to impact he increased his speed because, "That is what
I usually do when I pass a car" (R-97).
Counsel asked, "Didn't it ever occur to you, Mr.
Murray, that that car was going to do something
other than go straight up the road?"
A. "I didn't think she would."

Q. "And a vehicle, if it is going five miles an hour,
will give you some indication that something
is going to happen?"
A. "No.''

Q. "It doesn't?"
A. "A lot of people drive slow."

Q. "You just speed up and go around them, is
that right?"
A. "Yes."

Q. "You didn't honk other than 300 feet down
the road approximately or more, is that right,
7

from the point of impact; you honked back
here?"
A. "That is right."

Q. "About 300 feet, is that correct?"
A. "That is right" (R-97).
Defendant's state of mind 1s thus established
together with his negligence. The critical question
then becomes one of plaintiff's negligence which
would be a bar to her recovery. Plaintiff testified she
saw the truck in the right hand road 75 feet behind
her just before making her turn, and that she had her
left hand blinker light on for 131 feet prior to impact (R-48). Hansen's testimony would establish
that she had substantially negotiated her turn before
collision. The testimony of Mr. Beardall would substantiate Hansen's opinion as to point of impact.

Q. (of Mr. Beardall) "Did you look at the area
where the two cars had collided before they
came to rest?"
A. "Yes."

Q. "What did you see there?"
A. "I had seen where the Murray truck had went
off the shoulder trying to get away from hitting the car."
8

Q. "Did you observe anything at the point of impact?"
A. "It was on the shoulder."

Q. "Did you observe any tracks?"
A. "Yes, sir."

Q. "And what did you observe?"
A. "I observed tracks along the shoulder."

Q. "On the shoulder right here?"
A. "There was snow on the shoulder, but none
on the road. (The witness then made a dotted
line on Exhibit 1 with a black marker.) (R34, 34)
The opinion of Mr. Hansen comes within the
scope of testimony of an expert witness. An authoritative article on "Opinion Evidence; Point of Collision" is found in 66 ALR 2d 1048. The editor cites
the Utah case of State v. Bleazard, 103 U 113, 113
P 2d 1000 for the proposition that Utah is one of
the states holding "that skilled or expert testimony
would be of aid to the jury or the court in drawing
the correct inferences from the raw and unsorted
facts, and that such opinion testimony would not
usurp the province of the jury, ... under the proper
9

circumstances, skilled or expert op1n10n evidence
as to the point of impact or collision is admissible,"
66 ALR 2d 1052.
The editor further elaborated on the general rule
as follows:
"The general rule that skilled or expert
opinion evidence is admissible only where,
by reason of peculiar skill and experience,
inferences which an ordinary untrained
mind cannot deduce can be drawn from
facts, or where such testimony relates to a
subject which is not within the average experience and common knowledge of a jury;
and that such evidence is not admissible
where the subject is one which can be intelligently described to a jury and understood by them and they can form a reasonable opinion for themselves, has been applied in motor vehicle accident cases wherein skilled or expert opinion has been offered to prove the point of impact or collision,"
66 ALR 2d 1054.
The record shows conflicting testimony as to the
point of impact and the testimony of Mr. Hansen
would have greatly aided the jury in determining
the negligent operation of plaintiff's vehicle. In
10

support of the above rule, the editor cites the cases
of Een v. Consolidated Freightway, 120 F Supp 189,
aff'd 220 F 2d 82 (1954 DC ND), wherein the court
noted differences in the testimony and concluded
that one experienced in accident investigation would
be of aid to the jury and his testimony would be admissible. Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
104 Cal App 2d 716, 232 P 2d 572, wherein the court
held that the disputed point of impact was proper
testimony from an expert. To the same effect are
Tuck v. Buller, 311 P 2d 212, Long v. State, 274 P. 2d
553, and Hazelrig Trucking Co. v. Duvall, 261 P 2d
204.
It is submitted that the plaintiff was entitled to
have Mr. Hansen give his opinion as to the point of
impact, and that proper foundation was laid upon
which that opinion could be given. Because of the
question of plaintiff's negligence, the point of impact
was critical in showing that the plaintiff exercised
due care and that the negligence of defendant was
the sole and proximate cause of the accident. To refuse to allow Hansen to testify was prejudicial
error.
2. THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED BY
PREJUDICE, BIAS, AND PASSION IN ITS
AW ARD TO PLAINTIFF MARGARET BEARDALL.
11

The jury in answer to question five of the special
verdict "What amount of money would reasonably
compensate the plaintiff Margaret Beardall for
medical expenses in connection with the injury to
her?" awarded plaintiff Three Hundred Two do'.lars, Ninety One cents, which was the amount testified to (R-59).
In response to question six, "What amount of
money would reasonably compensate the plaintiff
Margaret Beardall for general damages she suffered as a result of the injury to her?" the jury awarded the sum of Two Thousand Dollars, which was the
exact amount that Dr. Kezerian testified would be
required for an operation on Mrs. Beardall (R-121).
The jury awarded absolutely nothing for l'dn 2nd
suffering.
The general rule of law is wen stated in 20 ALR
2d 276 wherein is found an Annotation dealjng directly with the above case and entitled, "Validity of
Verdict awarding plaintiff in personal injury action amount of medical expenses but failing to
award damages for pain and suffering." The introduction states:
"The question discussed in this annotation is
whether a verdict may validly award plaintiff in a
12

personal injury action the exact amount of his
medical expenses, without simultaneously awarding
him damages for pain and suffering where claim
therefore was properly made and proven.
The number of cases in which this question has
been specifically answered is relatively small. But
despite the dearth of authority, it seems permissible
to state, on general principles that such a verdict is
invalid, and ·all the cases in which this particular
point was involved are in accord with this rule,"
(Emphasis added).
The cases in the annotation support the above
rule that the verdict is invalid.
An additional authority for the rule stated in
the annotation is Olson v. Christiansen, 41 NW2d
248 (Minnesota), wherein after concluding that
the evidence showed plaintiff sustained pain
and suffering for which the jury had not awarded
damages, the Court stated :
"Either plaintiff was entitled to recover
his actual special damages and something
additional for general damages, or he is
entitled to recover nothing at all. Where
general damages are substantial, an award
of nothing the refore or a mere nominal
award will not do."
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In the case of Montgomery v. Simon, 33NE 2d 642
the defendant had testified that
medicals
were covered by insurance. The court in that case
concluded that this knowledge on the part of thP
jury would have been the reason for the award of
just slightly more than specials and stated:
)

"It is the settled iaw of this state that
where it is obvious that the jury has failed
to take into consideration proper elements
of damage which have been clearly proven,
and have awarded plaintiff
inadequate damages, a motion for new trial
should be sustained by the trial court."
The importance of the l\rlontgomery case to the
instant case is the approach of the court and its
statement of the rule of law.
In Sorg v. Royal, 31 82d 317, (Florida) the award
was less than proven specials and the court stated:

"The law will not permit the whims and
caprice of a jury, when considering factual
question, to prevail over a preponderance
of the evidence as shown by the record."
Another case supporting plaintiff is Fitzgerald
v. Penn Transit Co., 44 A2cl 288 (Pennsylvania),
wherein the jury award was slightly more than the
14

medical expenses and the loss of wages, and the
court determined that where the issue of negligence
had been decided by the jury against the defendant,
that the jury could not disregard instructions and
evidence on pain and suffering and temporary disability of the plaintiff.
In the instant case as in Fitzgerald, it is submitted that the jury disregarded instructions and
the evidence of pain and suffering.
The special verdict shows the prejudice and bias
that the jury felt against the plaintiff.
The absence of an award for pain and suffering
shows the lack of objectivity and understanding of
the case by the jury. This is another factor which
militates for plaintiff's requested relief of a new
trial, which would put the parties back in their
original positions to begin anew.
3. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION OF THE JURY.
Plaintiff excepted the court's failure to give
plaintiffs requested instructions one, five, seven,
eight, nine, and ten, and to the court's instructions
seven and ten (R-153). Plaintiff's exceptions when
viewed together form a pattern wherein the in15

struction relates to and supports another instruction. The purpose of plaintiff's requested instructions was to critically and carefully outline the law
in the State of Utah and the legal duty each driver
has toward another driver. The instant case is the
type of case wherein a jury, if not carefully and
critically instructed, could conclude that an accident
happened and there must be fault on both sides or
else the accident would not have happened. Plaintiff tried to overcome this natural tendency by having the court instruct the jury as to the duty of
defendant and plaintiff. Once defendant's duties are
established the jury can more clearly determine upon sound legal principles the alleged negligence of
the plaintiff.
An example of the prejudicial effect of the court's
error is its failure to give requested instruction five
concerning the duty of defendant to give adequate
warning. The law is clearly set out in the case of
Barton v. Jensen, 19 U 2d 196, 429 P. d44, wherein
the Court said, "While there is no general duty upon
the driver to sound his horn before passing other
vehicles, he does have a duty to give audible warning
of his approach and intention to pass where it would
appear from all the circumstances that such a warning is reasonably necessary to insure safe operation." Cited in the case are UCA 41-6-55 (b) and
16

41-6-146, Manning v. Powers 117 U 310, 215 P2d 396,
and N aisbitt v. Eggert, 5 U2d 5, 295 P2 832.
The testimony is clear that defendant honked
his horn at a time and place when nobody could hear
it (R-25), and when he got close to the plaintiff's
vehicle where some preventive driving could have
been done, he failed to give any warning. When a car
is going five miles an hour with a left blinker light
going (which defendant didn't see until he was right
next to it), those circumstances entitled plaintiff to
an instruction that defendant has a duty to warn
plaintiff of his passing. Failure to give the instruction in light of the testimony allows defendant the
advantage of de-emphasizing a critical point in the
case. If he were required to honk his horn and give
plaintiff warning as the law requires,
the
plaintiff be negligent when defendant failed to
abide the law, particularly in view of her testimony
that she gave the proper signal and saw defendant
in the right hand lane of traffic only 75 feet prior
to impact? It is submitted that she would not be
negligent as a matter of law.
Plaintiff's proposed instructions, seven, eight,
and nine, all correctly instruct as to the law of passing, making turns, and right of way. UCA 41-6-55
states, "The driver of a vehicle overtaking another
17

vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass
to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall not
again drive to the right side of the roadway until
safely clear of the overtaken vehicle." UCA 41-6-56.
gives defendant the right to pass a vehicle makinub
or about to make a left hand turn on the right side;
which action, by the defendant, would have avoided
the accident. UCA 41-6-62 states, "The driver of a
motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more
closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due
regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic
upon and the condition of the highway." UCA 41-669 states: "Signals on turning, stopping, or suddenly
decreasing speed-When turning permissible. (a)
No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection
unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in section 41-6-66, or turn a vehicle
to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise
turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right
or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. No person
shall turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate
signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the
event any other traffic may be affected by such
movement.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left
shall be given continuously during not less than the
18

last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
( c) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to
the driver of any
immediately to the rear
when there is opportunity to give such signal."
From the above statutes, plaintiff formulated
instructions seven, eight, and nine, which require
plaintiff to signal 100 feet before making a left
turn. Plaintiff testified that she did this, and in
addition, that she checked her rear view mirror and
saw defendant 75 feet behind her in the right hand
lane before she made her turn. It was also shown
that her speed was rather constant for the 131 feet.
Defendant was found negligent by the jury and
in accord with the statutes above. However, if the
instructions above had been given as requested, it
would be clear to the jury that plaintiff was not in
violation of any statutory duty; and the jury, by
assessing the duties of the two drivers, might well
conclude that plaintiff was not negligent and had
complied with the duties required of her.
Plaintiff's objection to the court's failure to
give instruction ten was also based on a statute which
makes the father of the minor driver responsible
for the actions of the minor. Failure to give this in-
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struction is prejudicial to the plaintiff because the
jury is left to speculate as to the effect such a law
suit will have on a young man just starting his driv.
ing career, and the jury could be swayed to leniency
and discount his poor driving performance in his
interest and against plaintiff's interest.

1

Plaintiff objected to the court's instruction seven
for the reason that it is not a complete instruction,
that it does not fully instruct the jury, and says
nothing about right-of-way after a signal is given
or the duty of defendant to warn of his approach.
The instruction has the effect of "covering over''
defendant's responsibilities and makes the case more
susceptible to an uninformed verdict that "there
was an accident, so they must both be at fault."
The court's special verdict form was objected to
for the reason that a case involving negligence considerations does not need a special verdict. The
special verdict did point up the bias and prejudice
of the jury and the effect the improper instruction
had on them. Barton v. Jensen, supra, points out the
objection of this court to special verdicts wherein
the court, after suggesting that a general verdict
in the Barton case would be preferable, states, "It
appears that the best efforts of trial judges to make
interrogatories simple, concise, and understandable,
still result in juries misunderstanding what is in-
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tended." The confusion exhibited by the jury (R-159,
160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168) was a manifestation of the very problem outlined by this court.
The instructions of the court were not definite
enough to inform the jury as to the legal duties of
the parties. The jury was left to speculate as to the
negligence of the parties without first receiving
critical statutory instructions on their duties. How
simple it would be to say, "they are both at fault,"
even though there is nothing in the record to show
that plaintiff was in violation of any legal duty.
Plaintiff is prejudiced by such instructions and is entitled to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The court erred in denying plaintiff to introduce
testimony of an expert on the point of impact which
would have a substantial bearing on plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence. Negligence would not
have been found against plaintiff had the jury been
critically and properly instructed. There were too
many concepts of legal duty on which the jury could
speculate, creating a great chance that with ou:t
proper instructions the jury would find both parties
at fault since an accident occurred. The failure to
award pain and suffering was indicative of the bias
and prejudice against plaintiff. Even though she
1
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had suffered greatly, the jury would not award any
payment for pain and suffering over anticipated
medical expenditures. Plaintiff has been greatly
prejudiced by the above actions of the court and is
entitled to a trial wherein all of the facts are before
a properly instructed jury who are not prejudiced against plaintiff to such an extent that they
will not award for pain and suffering.
Respectfully submitted,

S. Rex Lewis for
HOW ARD AND LEWIS
Delphi Building
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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